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The Problem 
With the number of disasters increasing around the world, it is now widely acknowledged that professional responders will not always 
be in place in time or in sufficient numbers to assist the public. It has therefore been recognized that community resilience is necessary.1 
However, in the past, there have been two obstacles to fully implementing this recognition in guidance and in practice. The first is that, 
historically, professionals and policymakers involved in preparedness have been concerned that crowds are particularly prone to panic. 
The second obstacle was a representation of the public as having only a passive role and therefore perceiving professional emergency 
response organizations as indispensable. These representations have been the basis of paternalistic ‘command and control’ policies in 
emergency response.2 These policies are not only impractical given the increased threat of disaster, but also can operate as a self-
fulfilling prophecy. For example, restricting public information can reduce the public’s sense of agency and hence their capacity to cope 
with adversity. What is needed was a new psychology, one that explained the conditions for community resilience in ad hoc crowds. 
 
The Science 
Over fifty years of psychological, sociological and documentary research evidence converges on the view that collective behaviour in 
mass emergencies and disasters is typically socially structured and adaptive, with cooperation being common among survivors.3 The 
question was why: what was the process? A team at Sussex hypothesized that an emergent shared social identity is the basis for co-
operative behaviour arising among strangers. A study of survivor behaviour during the July 7th London bombings illustrated the process.4 
Members of the crowd of commuters in the bombed out trains provided each other with emotional support, shared bottles of water and 
even tied tourniquets. The disaster had created a sense of common fate which enhanced perceptions of within-group similarity and the 
clarity of group boundaries, augmenting identification with other survivors as a category. Therefore, a key reason for social behaviour in 
emergency crowds is a shared identity which defines interests as collective. This social identity hypothesis was incorporated into a model 
of informal collective resilience that was then validated across a number of studies of mass emergencies.5 The model was then extended 
to understanding the effects of interactions between emergency responders and survivors during mass decontamination following 
chemical incidents.6 
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The Application to Policy and Practice 
The research suggested that resilience planning needed to recognize the potentially active role of the crowd rather than assume it to 
be either mindless or passive. While there were already a number of concepts available to explain social behaviour in disasters – such 
as social network and social capital – these tended to apply to structured or geographically located communities where people 
already have interpersonal social bonds. The innovation of the social identity approach to collective resilience was that it applied to 
ad hoc crowds. Further, the social identity concept offered a new way of thinking about both survivors as a group and the relationship 
between such groups and professional responders; it served to make sense of those existing practices (such as public information and 
good communication) that practitioners knew worked well and to justify the extension of such good practice in a theoretically-
grounded way.  
There were a number of specific ways that recommendations based on the social identity approach could inform the relationship 
between survivors and responders in order to facilitate the active role of the crowd in emergencies. First, emergency planners 
needed to accommodate the public urge to help. As well as being necessary, this could build unity and trust. Second, in order to have 
collective agency, the crowd requires information to act. People caught up in emergencies want information and feel anxious without 
that information.
7
 Third, trust was necessary. In the research on chemical incidents, the more professional responders were seen as 
legitimate by members of the public, the more the public came to share a social identity with them. This trust and identification led 
members of the public to internalize and ‘own’ the guidance that they were given. They then became active participants not passive 
recipients of care.8 The result was a much more effective and efficient emergency response – which could in practice save lives in 
incidents where speed is of the essence.  
 
Did it make a Difference? 
The findings on the emergent group bases of collective resilience were included in the research informing new guidance on 
psychosocial care for people in emergencies. Thus, the NATO Stepped Model of Care builds on survivors’ psychosocial capacities 
rather than assuming them to be ill or helpless, and recommends practical support rather than psychiatric care for most people 
affected by emergencies. The capacities of crowds are included in this. The Department of Health Emergency Preparedness Division’s 
2009 NHS Emergency Planning Guidance draws upon the social identity concept of collective resilience in advice on the role of group 
support in coping with a flu pandemic. The research on mass decontamination has been used to inform hospital/patient 
decontamination ‘best practice’ guidance documents in the UK and North America. In each of these cases, practices have been 
transformed by the recognition of the potential pro-active role of ad hoc crowds of survivors based on the notion of a shared social 
identity. This has resulted in a step change in emergency response and recovery planning procedures. The notion that crowds can be 
sources of resilience is not an argument that people should be simply left to fend for themselves when disaster strikes. But it does 
suggest that people have certain capacities as a collective in such circumstances and that emergency services need to enable this. 
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